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Reconsideration of Failure Initiating Mechanisms for 
Teton Dam* 
G. A. leonards 
Professor of Civil Engineering, School of Civil Engineering, Purdue University, 
West lafayette, Indiana 
l. W. Davidson 
Supervisory Civil Engineer, Embankment Dams Branch, Bureau of Reclamation, Denver, Colorado 
SYNOPSIS A review of failure mechanisms previously suggested for Teton Dam indicated that they were 
not fully supported by all the available data. The original mechanisms are reviewed and a failure 
initiation mechanism is then proposed which does satisfy all the available data, and laboratory 
tests supporting this mechanism are presented. Additional lessons to be learned from the failure 
are listed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Teton Dam failed on June 5, 1976. It was the 
first failure in the Bureau of Reclamation's 
74-year history of dam construction. It was 
the highest embankment dam that had ever failed 
catastrophically in the entire history of earth 
dam construction. These facts suggest that a 
unique combination of factors was responsible 
for the demise of the dam, and that full 
understanding of the mechanism of failure may 
make an important contribution to the 
state-of-the-art. 
The failure was investigated officially by two 
groups, the Independent Panel ( IP) and the 
Interior Review Group (IRG). The IP was com-
posed of nine engineers of international repute 
who completed their investigation and published 
a report of remarkable quality in the short time 
of 6 months (IP, 1976). The IRG was composed of 
representatives from five Federal agencies con-
cerned with dam construction; they published two 
reports, one in April 1977 (IRG, 1977) and 
another in January lg8o (IRG, 1980), the latter 
report following extensive excavations at the 
left abutment of the dam. A review of the fin-
dings given in these three reports, and a 
reanalysis of the factors involved, was pre-
sented at the X Intern. Conf. SMFE in 1981 and 
published in Proceedings (Seed and Duncan, 
1982). Why, then, yet another review of this 
failure? 
Teton Dam was breached very rapidly before the 
reservoir level reached the spillway sill on 
first filling. It is agreed that plugging of 
open joints ·in the bedrock, and filtering of 
the zone 1 core material should have been pro-
vided for, and that great care should have been 
taken in the construction of these design 
features. However, there is little agreement 
on the mechanism(s) that initiated the failure; 
hence, it is not certain that these measures 
would necessarily have prevented the failure 
from occurring. Moreover, if the actual mecha-
nism of failure were understood, protection 
against future failures might be accomplished 
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more reliably and at less cost. For these 
reasons, it is important to identify correctly 
the mechanisms that initiated failure. 
The paper reviews the likely failure mechanisms 
postulated in previous publications with par-
ticular attention to their evolution, and to 
the progressive enlargement of the lessons 
learned therefrom. Two new failure initiating 
mechanisms were reported by the IRG in 1980 and 
four additional mechanisms were advanced by 
Seed and Duncan in 1982. In our opinion, none 
of the failure mechanisms previously postulated 
are fully supported by all of the existing 
data. Accordingly, a failure mechanism is pro-
posed which stands up to such scrutiny and the 
results of experiments, specially designed to 
test its validity, are reported. In conclu-
sion, new lessons are added to the existing 
list, which have important implications for 
improving earth dam design and construction 
practices. 
REVIEW OF PLAUSIBLE FAILURE MECHANISMS 
General Considerations 
It is not feasible, nor is it necessary to pre-
sent herein details of the site conditions, of 
the design features and the dam configuration 
adopted, and of the sequence of events pre-
ceding failure, as an excellent summary of all 
these facets is readily available (Seed and 
Duncan, 1982). However, for general reference, 
a plan and a profile along the dam axis is 
shown in Fig. 1. In particular, the geometric 
similarity of the key trenches in the abutments 
is noted. From the location where muddy water 
was first observed to emerge on the downstream 
face of the dam, from the pattern in which the 
failure progressed, and from the location of 
the whirlpool that developed in the reservoir 
prior to breaching, it can be deduced that 
failure was initiated in the key trench near 
Sta. 14+00 and approximately at El. 5200. 
*Opinions expressed in this paper are solely those 
of the authors and do not reflect those of the 
Bureau of Reclamation. 
First International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering 
Missouri University of Science and Technology 
http://ICCHGE1984-2013.mst.edu
i.RIYER~ 
15100 OUTLET WORKS r' 
I 
(A) PLAN Of KEY TRENCH 
AND CUTOFF TRENCH 
IAULT FLOW-·/ 
...... .., ..... __ 
b/r-'--'--'-;;,.~-L-' - .1..-1...- J. _--~.--';-,,;,+ocooi-'--'-.J......J'-'---'--'-'•";:l:;.,;o', -'---'-.l-l-'-.,!,.:o;;:oo 
STATION 
*LOW DENSITY HIGH PERMEAIILITY ZONE (WETSEAM} 
(B) PROFILE ON CENTERLINE CREST 
OF DAM (LOOKING DOWNSTREAM) 
FIG. 1 TETON DAM 
The acceptability M a proposed failure mecha-
nism can be judged by the extent to which it 
explains the following observed facts: 
1. Failure occurred at the right abutment 
only. Excavation at the left abutment 
disclosed no evidence that failure bj inter-
nal erosion was imminent, or that piping had 
occurred to any extent; yet the size· and 
frequency of open joints in the rock were as 
severe at the left abutment key trench as 
they were at the right. Thus, some other 
weakness must have existed at the right 
abutment that was not present at the left. 
None of the failure mechanisms postulated 
thus far have attempted to identify the 
nature of this weakness. 
2. Failure occurred in an extremely short 
period of time. The dam was breached in 
less than 50 days after the reservoir first 
reached El. 5200, where failure is befi"evea 
to have been initiated. It is likely that 
the reservoir was at an elevation sufficient 
to induce piping for only a few days 
(perhaps only hours) prior to failure. 
Thus, an explanation for the cause of 
failure must include features that would 
permit the demise of the dam to occur so 
rapidly. 
Previously postulated failure mechanisms will 
now be examined in the light of the two cri-
teria listed above. 
Findings of the Independent Panel (1976) 
The IP concluded that the triggering mechanisms 
most likely to have led to the failure were: 
1. " ... the flow of water aginst the 
highly erodible and unprotected key trench 
filling, through joints in the unsealed rock 
immediately beneath the grout cap near 
Station 14+00 and the conseq~ent development 
of an erosion tunnel across the base of the 
key trench fill." 
and 
2. . .. cracking caused by differential 
strains or hydraulic fracturing of the core 
material filling the key trench. This 
cracking could also result in channels 
through the key trench fill which would per-
mit rapid internal erosion." 
The Panel noted that their description of the 
failure mechanism did not provide a final 
answer to the specific cause of failure, but 
they did conclude that the choice was between 
" .imperfect grouting of the rock below the 
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grout cap, or cracking in the key trench fill 
[near Sta. 14+00], or possibly both." 
Although the grout curtain was. installed in a 
workmanlike manner, there is no doubt that flow 
could occur below the grout cap through open joints in the rock and "windows" in the grout 
curtain. However, for piping to be initiated 
from the bottom of the key trench fill to 
create an erosion tunnel across the base of the 
trench (IP, 1977, Fig. 12-4, p. 12-8), there 
must have been open joints at the base of the 
key trench. --
Davidson personally observed the floor of the 
left key trench after it was exposed~ he 
affirms that no open joints were visible in the 
floor of the trench. Other Bureau personnel 
that were onsite confirm this view. There were 
cracks through which seepage could occur, but 
the openings were hardly larger than those of 
an acceptable filter. As the evidence is 
overwhelming that there were no open ~oints in 
the bottom of the left key trench, an as con-
ditions in the right key trench were stated to 
be better than in the left (see depositions by 
Bureau field personnel; IRG 1977, pp. C.-14 to 
C-22), the IP's postulate that failure was ini-
tiated by piping through open joints at the 
bottom of the key trench, and the consequent 
development of an erosion tunnel across the 
base of the key trench fill, is not supported 
by existing data. 
Open joints certainly existed in the upstream 
and downstream walls of the key trench. . 
Cracking caused~ifferential strains within 
the core material filling the key trench could 
readily develop into erosion channels across 
the key trench fill leading to rapid failure of 
the dam. However, careful examination of the 
slopes of the two abutments and key trenches, 
of the relative overall quality of the embank-
ment constructed at the two locations, and of 
the potential for Jnequal loading due to dif-
ferent construction sequences (or to seismic 
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activity) did not disclose any reason to sup-
port a greater tendency for differential 
settlement at the right vs. the left abutment. 
As "no cracks attributable to differential 
settlement of the embankment were found during 
the left embankment excavation" (IRG, 1980, 
p. 7-1), it is very unlikely that this mecha-
nism was a contributing cause of failure. 
Subsequent to the failure, an open joint (No. 
172) was mapped striking diagonally across the 
key trench floor between Sta. 14+64 and 14+83 
(IP, 1976, p. E-7). In this zone, much of 
the grout cap had been removed by the enormous 
flow of water that ensued. Because inspec-
tors had reported that open joints in the 
floor of the key trench had been sealed, we 
believe that the seal in joint No. 172 was 
similarly removed. 
Hydraulic fracturing (HF) is an alternate way 
in which cracks could develop in the key trench 
fi 11. The Independent Panel argued that this 
mechanism of failure was plausible on the 
following grounds: 
1. HF tests were performed in drill holes 
made into the unfailed portion of the left 
embankment remnant to determine the water 
pressures required to cause fracturing. 
2. Finite element (FE) analyses were made 
to determine the corresponding stress 
distribution in the embankment. Soil 
stress-strain parameters were selected which 
would correctly predict the result of the 
borehole HF tests. 
3. The parameters derived in this manner 
were then used in FE analyses to evaluate 
the stress distribution in the dam section 
where it was deduced failure had occurred 
and thereby assess the possibility that HF 
could cause cracks to develop in the core of 
the dam due to water pressure on the 
upstream face. 
On this basis, the Panel concluded that HF was 
among the three most plausible mechanisms of 
failure. We disagree with the basis for this 
conclusion, for the following reasons: 
1. In October-November 1976 the IP caused 
three holes to be drilled in the left 
embankment remnant for HF testing. One hole 
(HF-6) was abandoned due to difficulties in 
drilling; in the second hole (HF-7) hydro-
fracturing did not occur even when the 
casing was filled to its top elevation of 
5318.5 (maximum reservoir elevation was 
5302). The difficulties encountered with 
the t h i r d h o 1 e ( H F- 5) h ave been de t a i 1 e d. by 
Davidson (1978). Drilling started with a 
rock bit and clear water at the location 
shown i n F i g. 1. At a depth of 101 feet 
(El. 5212) all drill water was lost. 
Drilling continued for another 49 ft; during 
this drilling, 3,000 gal of water were 
pumped in within an hour with no return. An 
inner casing was placed and the annular 
space was sealed at the bottom for approxi-
mately 2 ft with cement grout. A smaller 
rock bit and air pressure were then used to 
extend the hole another 40 ft, at which time 
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the seal between the casings was broken. 
Later, a new inner casing was set and 
plugged, but atte~pts to extend the hole 
below El. 5129 resulted in caving and 
sloughing into the hole with mud and muddy 
water noted to El. 5159. The IP concluded 
that fracturing had occurred when borehole 
water was first 1 ost at El. 5212 and used a 
fracture head of 101 ft to back-calculate 
the stress-strain parameters in the finite 
element analysis. 
During excavation of the left abutment rem-
nant in 1977, no trace was found of the 
3,000 gal of water pumped into hole HF-5 
between El. 5212 and 5163. No fracture 
plane was found at the elevation of first 
water loss into the hole. In the light of 
this hindsight, there is no evidence to sup-
port the fracture head adopted to back-
calculate stress-strain parameters for the 
soil. Thus the reliability of all further 
analyses using these parameters is open to 
serious question. 
2. A two-dimensional FE analysis was per-
formed with soil properties assumed to be 
isotropic. Considering the steepness of the 
abutment walls, the anisotropic nature of 
compacted clay, and the sensitivity of 
calculated lateral stresses to values of 
Poisson's ratio, there was little reason to 
place much credence in the results of the 
FE analysis. This is especially true since 
the calculated fracture pressure for 
hole HF-7 was 6.4 ksf while, in fact, in the 
only hole to be drilled and tested without 
incident, hydraulic fractu~ing did not occur 
at a water pressure of 7.8 ksf. 
While the IP pointed out the limitations of the 
analysis and stated that "the criterion of ini-
tiation of hydraulic fracturing utilized herein 
may require modification," it seems that, even 
at the time, there was at least as much reason 
to question the viability of this mechanism of 
failure as there wa$ to cite it as a prime 
candidate. 
In retrospect, careful and detailed examination 
of the excavations at the left embankment rem-
n~nt disclosed no evidence of hydraulic frac-
turing- in the sense envisioned in the IP 
report - due to pressure from the reservoir*. 
Unless it can be shown why hydraulic fracturing 
should occur at the right abutment and not at 
the left the sudden formation of vertical 
cracks by hydraulic fracturing, that would pro-
gress rapidly to form 'COntinuous channels from 
the upstream to the downstream walls of the 
key trench, should not be considered a pl ausi -· 
ble mechanism of failure. 
* Cracks due to drilling using air pressure of 
up to 150 lb/in2 were indeed observed, but no 
fractures due to water pressure from the reser-
v o. i r were found . 
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Findings of the Interior Review Group, 1977 
In their first report, the IRG (1977) stated: 
"The most probable physical mode of failure 
was cracking of the impervious core material 
either due to hydraulic fracturing or dif-
ferential settlement within the embankment 
that allowed the initiation of erosion." 
This finding is identical to the second conclu-
sion reached by the Independent Panel; the fac-
tors mitigating against its validity have 
already been discussed in detail. The IRG went 
on to say: 
"Somewhat les~ probable is the concept that 
damaging seepage started at the contact of 
zone 1 (impervious core) material and the 
rock surface. The open fractures in the 
abutment foundation rock allowed direct 
access by reservoir water to the impervious 
core on the upstream side of the key trench. 
Any water flowing through the impervious 
core could exit int~ open fractures on the 
downstream side of the key trench." 
The exact meaning of the above quote is not 
clear. Water "flowing through the impervious 
core" could include seepage at the interface 
between the key trench floor and the fill. 
Considering the relatively even surface of the 
floor and grout cap in the area wh~re fail~r~ 
was initiated, the special compact1on spec1f1ed 
at this juncture, and statements by construc-
tion supervision staff that this aspect of the 
specifications was faithfully executed (which 
is borne out by construction photographs), 
piping along the fill/rock interface should not 
occur unless the hydraulic gradient was abnor-
mally high. At El. 5200, approximately where 
failure is believed to have been initiated, the 
head at maximum reservoir level was 103 ft, 
corresponding to a maximum hydraulic gradient 
of approximately 3 to 4 across the base of the 
key trench. Many dams have withstood gradients 
of this order at the core/rock interface 
without incident. 
Water flowing through the key trench fill from 
open joints on the upstream wall at full reser-
voir head to open joints in the downstream wall 
could, of course, start erosion into the 
downstream joints. However,· excavation of the 
left abutment key trench diiclosed no instance 
in which flow had progressed much more than 
half way across the key trench fill. Again, 
unless it can be shown that conditions in the 
right abutment key trench were different than 
at the left, it is unlikely that this mechanism 
initiated the failure. It may be argued that, 
eventually, seepage would occur through the key 
trench fill. Piping could then start at joints 
in the downstream wall and progressively erode 
a channel extending to the upstream face, which 
would allow further erosion to take place 
rapidly. This could be true, although it has 
been demonstrated (Wittke, 1984) that piping 
into open rock joints can be a slow process, 
and may have provided sufficient warning for 
remedial measures to prevent breaching of the 
dam. Nevertheless, we fully concur that 
failure to seal open joints in the rock and to 
provide filters to prevent piping from 
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occurring was a serious design error at Teton 
Dam. 
In the 1977 report, the IRG recommended addi-
tional investigations of the left abutment and 
embankment remnant. It was stated: 
"Physical conditions on the left abutment 
are very similar to those of the right abut-
ment. An investigation of the embankment 
and embankment foundation contact surface 
will be made by a means that will permit 
visual inspection." 
"The investigation will be primarily to 
search for cracks in the remaining left 
embankment and to find evidences of erosion 
of the zone 1 [core] and the rock surface." 
"Further in situ stress investigations are 
planned." 
To the credit of the Bureau, these recommen-
dations were fully implemented. Over 
880,000 yd3 of embankment were carefully exca-
vated and visually examined, in open exca~a­
tion, test pits, trenches, adits~ and bor1ngs. 
Additional hydrofracturing, in s1tu per-
meability, and field density and moist~re tests 
were carried out; an instrument to mon1tor 
foundation rock rebound was installed; record 
samples (including cubic ft blocks) were 
obtained for further testing in the laboratory; 
and additional core drilling was done in the 
right and left abutment key trenches to ~xplore 
further the condition of the grout curta1n. It 
was probably the most comprehensive post-
construction investigation ever made on a civil 
engineering structure, whether failed o~ 
unfailed. The results were documented 1n a 
second report by the IRG (IRG, 1980). The main 
findings were: 
1. The floor of the left key trench was 
relatively smooth and free of open joints. 
2. The bottom 12 to 18 inches of key trench 
fill upstream of the grout cap were nearly 
saturated. Fill in contact with the foun-
dation downstream of the grout cap generally 
was not saturated, but several. locations 
were found where upstream to downstream 
penetration of water had occurred across the 
grout cap. No locations were found where 
the nearly saturated fill extended across 
the full width of the key trench floor. 
[The assessments were based on subjective 
determination of moisture content and on 
measured water contents and calculated 
degrees of saturation. In general, it was 
difficult to distinguish a "wetting surface" 
visually.] 
3. While grout from rock surface treatment 
was found in some of the joints in the left 
key trench walls, mostly in the downstream 
wall, many open joints were also encoun-
tered. One such joint in the downstream 
wall was nearly vertical, 3ft high, and 
about 6 in wide. 
4. In compliance with the specifications, 
fill material had been compacted into open joints in the trench walls. Material within joints at the upstream wall face became 
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wetted with reservoir water and was loose. 
[However, we are aware of no case where 
sloughed material was found penetrating more 
than a few inches into the main body of the 
fill.] 
5. Joints in the left abutment rock outside 
of the key trench were generally open but no 
fill erosion into these joints was observed. 
6. Nineteen core holes were pressure tested 
with water to determine the tightness of the 
grout curtain. Water losses indicated that 
the grout curtain was of adequate quality to 
control seepage losses, but it was not 
impervious enough to prohibit flow from 
occurring. 
7. Three additional holes were drilled for 
hydraulic fracturing testing using air-foam 
drilling. Great care was exercised during 
drilling, placement of casing, and sealing 
of the test sections. In all three cases, 
the holes were filled with water to the top 
of the casing but no hydraulic fracturing 
was observed; at this time the water level 
in HF-11 (in the key trench) was 18ft above 
the reservoir elevation at failure, while in 
holes HF-14 and HF-15 (in the center of the 
emQankment) it was 30 ft above this reser-
volr level. 
8. No erosion of fill was observed either 
above or below the grout cap. 
9. No visible cracks, except those clearly 
associated with hydraulic fracture tests 
were observed in the fill. No pipi~ any 
kind was observed. 
It is worthwhile to pause and remind ourselves 
that the primary purpose of this massive addi-
tional investigation was "to search for cracks 
in the remaining left embankment and to find 
evidences of erosion channels through the core 
or at the contact of the zone 1 and the rock 
surface" (IRG, 1977, p. 105). In fact, abso-
lutely nothing of this nature was uncovered. 
However, on October 5, 1977, a surprising and 
heretofore unobserved phenomenon was disco-
vered: a soi 1 layer in zone 1 was noticed to 
be seeping water at Sta. 24+50, 150 ft upstream 
from the dam centerline and near El. 5113. 
T~ere had been no awareness of extremely wet 
f1ll as the removal of material had proceeded 
through the elevation of the seepage zone 
between the embankment remnant and the abut-
ment. During subsequent field investigations, 
nu~erous such seepage zones were encountered, 
wh1ch were termed "wet seams." The discovery 
of the wet seams on the left side of the 
embankment led to speculation that a similar 
s~am on the righ~ side may have been respon-
Slble for the fa1lure of the dam. In view of 
this possibility, a careful study to determine 
the cause, character, location, and signifi-
cance of the wet seams was immediately under-
taken by the IRG. It is not feasible to 
present herein even a brief review of all the 
major findings; hence, we must content our-
se~ves with a discussion only of those features 
wh1ch led us to propose our version of the most 
likely mechanism of fail~re. 
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The "Wet Seams" 
The characteristics of the wet seams most rele-
vant to this discussion are: 
a. Geometr~. The thickness of a wet seam 
never excee ed one loose lift (8 in +); 
usually, they were 4 in or less in thick-
ness. What was initially thought to be a 
nearly continuous single wet seam was 
actually multiple wet seams, localized 
pockets, and discontinuous lenses. Asso-
ciation of wet seams with variations in the 
compaction process is inescapable. 
b. Moisture/Density. The in situ water 
content ranged from 22.3 to 33.0 percent, 
average 28.0 percent, 9.4 percent above the 
average for all zone 1 fill. The in situ 
dry unit weight ranged from 82.3 to 
96.5 lb/ft3, average 90.3 lb/ft3, 
8.8 lb/ft3 less than the average for all 
zone 1 fill. The Proctor optimum moisture 
content and dry unit weight were 3.1 percent 
above the average OMC (19.7 percent) and 
5.3 lb/ft3 below the average maximum density 
(101.1 lb/ft3) for all zone 1 fill. These 
results show that: 
In situ moisture contents are far above 
optimum, a~d the average is more than 
5 percent wet of optimum, although the 
frequency distribution for zone 1 fill 
(IRG, 1980, p. 4-22) shows that vir-
tually 100 percent of the fill was 
placed drier than 1 percent wet of 
optimum. Therefore, the high water 
contents must be due to post-placement 
infiltration. 
In situ dry unit weights and Proctor 
optimum densities are very low in com-
parison with the average of zone 1 
fill. This suggests that the proper-
ties of the material in the wet seams 
are different from the average, but as 
the high water contents are due to 
post-placement infiltration, other 
layers with properties similar to those 
in the wet seams could exist that have 
not yet been infiltrated and, there-
fore, would not appear as wet seams. 
Thus, it is not necessary for a wet 
seam to have been in contact with the 
rock of the right abutment. What is 
relevant is the possibility that 
material similar to that in the wet 
seams could have been compacted in the 
right abutment key trench. 
If the compaction characteristics of 
the material in the wet seam were 
misjudged and thought to be more 
like the average of material in zone 1, 
the placement water content could 
actually be much drier than the 
3.5 percent below OMC permitted by the 
specifications. 
The result is the extreme likelihood that 
layers of silt compacted very dry of optimum 
were incorporated in the dam, at the left as 
well as the right abutment. This is clearly 
indicated in Fig. 2, which shows that 
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samples of the Teton silt can be compacted 
to D-ratios >95 percent at water contents 
more than 8 percent dry of optimum, while 
the Nebraskan silts fall below D = 95 per-
cent when the water content is 3.4 percent 
dry of optimum. 
c. Permeability. Horizontal and vertical 
permeability tests were conducted on samples 
from hand-cut blocks taken from zone 1 fill. 
Fig. 3 shows the relation between average 
horizontal permeability and dry density 
obtained from these tests. Typica11y, per-
meabilities in the wet seams are an order of 
magnitude higher than outside the wet seams. 
The IRG attributed these large differences 
in permeability primarily to differences in 
dry density and not to other physical, che-
mical, or mineralogical differences. We 
interpret it to mean that the wet seam 
samples not only had lower densities but 
also were compacted initially well on the 




















LOCATION rd max OMC [pcfl percent 
TETON DAM 97.0 22.0 WET SEAM 
TETON DAM 92.7 23.7 
ZONE 1 96.3 21.6 
PEORIAN SILT 105.2 18.5 NEBRASKA 
NORTH PLATTE 107.3 17.0 NEBRASKA 
FIG. 2 COMPACTION RATIO VS. DEVIATION FROM 0 M C 
FOR TETON AND NEBRASKAN SILTS 
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FIG. 3 AVERAGE HORIZONTAL COEFFI-
CIENT OF PERMEABILITY VS. DRY DENSITY, 
BLOCK SAMPLES FROM LEFT ABUTMENT 
EXCAVATION 
d. Collapse Potential. Three specimens 
from a wet seam sack sample were compacted 
to approximately 90 lb/ft3 (93 percent of 
Proctor maximum) at moisture contents 0.4, 
1.1, and 3.5 percent dry of Proctor OMC. 
After curing they were consolidated rapidly 
without wetting to 80 lb/in2, the approxi-
mate preconsolidation pressure of block 
samples from the wet seams. The 80-lb/in2 
pressure was maintained for 24 hours before 
the samples were wetted. Fig. 4 shows the 
additional compression, or "collapse," on 
wetting. The 2.6 percent collapse was con-
sidered excessive and undesirable, as it was 
thought it would probably lead to cracking 
in the relatively brittle zone 1 fill. 
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COLLAPSE ON WETTING 
RATIO• UNWETTED COMPRESSION -percent 
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REDUCTION IN VOLUME ON 
WETTING - percent 
FIG. 4 PERCENT VOLUME REDUCTION AND COLLAPSE 
RATIO VS DEVIATION FROM OPTIMUM MOISTURE 
CONTENT, SAMPLE FROM .. WET SEAM 
Conclusions of the IRG, 1980 
In 1980, the IRG concluded that the discovered 
conditions in zone 1 fill supported the 
following physical modes by which piping could 
have been initiated: 
1. "Seepage of reservoir water along either 
the fill/rock contact surface or near the 
top of the grout curtain in the right key 
trench, or 
2. "Seepage of reservoir water through a 
low density, high permeability lens located 
within or adjacent to the right key trench." 
These conclusions are drastically different 
from the findings stated in the 1977 report and 
is illustrative of the evolution in thinking 
regarding the primary mechanisms of failure as 
more data were developed and more time to study 
all aspects of the failure became available. 
Nevertheless, they went on to say: 
"No cracks associated with reservoir-induced 
hydraulic fracturing or differential settle-
ment within the embankment were discovered. 
However, evaluation of hydraulic fracture 
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test data indicates the possible occurrence 
of embankment stresses low enough for 
hydraulic fracturing to occur." 
Arguments supporting our belief that neither 
conclusion 1, nor cracking due to hydraulic 
fracturing are likely mechanisms ~f failure 
have already been presented. Although we 
believed that the dam failed too rapidly for 
the mechanism described in conclusion 2 to have 
occurred, it "rang a bell" which ultimately led 
to our explanation of the failure mechanism. 
Findings of Seed and Duncan (1982) 
The retrospective review by Seed and Duncan 
(1982) included several important contribu-
tions, foremost among which was the review of 
additional hydro-fracturing studies conducted 
at the University of California (Jaworski, 
1979; Jaworski, Duncan, and Seed, 1981). Among 
the "useful tentative hypotheses" proposed, 
relating to the occurrence of hydraulic frac-
turing were the following: 
"Hydraulic fracturing is promoted by, and 
may, in fact, require the presence of a 
discontinuity, such as a b-orehole, an 
existing crack, or loose soil adjacent to 
a rock joint, within which the water 
pressure can act to create tensile 
stresses through a wedging action in the 
soil." 
"Hydraulic separation can occur at an 
interface between soil and an adjacent 
dissimilar material such as concrete or 
rocK as soon as the water pressure 
reaches the same magnitude as the normal 
stress across the interface" [assuming no 
adhesion between the soil and rock]. 
[As tests showed that the rate at which 
the water pressure is increased, as well 
as the size of the zone within which 
stress redistribution and changes in 
water content occur, have a profound 
effect on the fracturing pressure.] 
" ... thus, the pressures required to 
cause fracturing during reservoir filling 
may be different for a borehole test th~n 
the water pressure application on the 
core of a dam." 
Seed and Duncan concluded: 
"As a result of these studies it was 
concluded that hydraulic fracturing could 
occur in the key trenches under the seepage 
and water pressure conditions existing at 
the time of failure. However, it could only 
occur in limited portions of the fill having 
the right combination of 
(1) open rock joints 
(2) soi 1 type 
(3) location of joints in the key trench 
(4) outlet rock joints on the downstream 
face 
(5) in-situ stress conditions. 
This may explain why failure occurred near 
Station 15+00 and nowhere else." 
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It has already been pointed out that the rock joints in the left abutment key trench were, if 
anything, more open than on the right, and that 
the geometries of the two key trenches were 
essentially identical. No reason is given why 
the soil type in the right abutment key trench 
~hould be more susceptible to fracturing than 
1n the left key trench. As no evidence of 
hydraulic fracturing due to reservoir seepage 
was found in the left abutment excavations, the 
argument that it caused failure at the right 
abutment is not supported by the existing data. 
Seed and Duncan (1982) proposed three addi-
tional possibilities for the failure, all three 
of which required 
"water to flow, with accompanying erosion, 
from an upstream open joint [in the floor of 
the trench] along the base of the key 
trench, over the 9rout cap and into a 
downstream joint Lin the floor of the 
trench] as illustrated in Fig •.•. " 
~s stated previously, we believe the probabil-
lty that such open joints existed in the floor 
of the right key trench to be very remote-.----
Seed and Duncan also offered a fourth potential 
mechanism of failure: 
"The remote possibility that a wet seam 
existed in the right abutment key trench 
permitting seepage directly through the seam 
and associated internal erosion." 
This mechanism is similar to conclusion (2) in 
the 1980 IRG report, except that the IRG did 
not require that the low density-high per-
meability layer initially be a wet seam. This 
possibility will be discussed later. 
PROPOSED FAILURE MECHANISM 
The basic requirements of a viable mechanism to 
explain the failure of Teton Dam are reiterated 
as follows: 
1. A weakness with respect to seepage ero-
sion must have existed in the right abutment 
and not at the left, and 
2. The opportunity must exist to promote 
failure by seepage erosion in a matter of a 
few days after the reservoir reached an ele-
vation sufficient to initiate the erosive 
action. 
As soon as it was recognized that a high per-
meability layer could have been built com-
pletely across the right key trench fill and 
not across the left, it immediately became 
apparent that this could be checked using the 
records of compaction control tests. The data 
were computerized and printouts of the 
moisture/density test results, station by sta-
tion, were obtained. Data at locations 
corresponding to the key trench fill, on both 
abutments, were then plotted for each 100-ft 
tnterval. At only one locale did the data 
suggest a continuous stratum of soil compacted 
on the dry side of optimum, which - notably -
turned out to be 14+00, ·as illustrated in 
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Fig. 5. We appreciate that the data are insuf-
ficient to reach a definitive conclusion; 
nevertheless, this remarkable result led us to 
believe there is a high probability that a 
continuous layer of high permeability was 
constructed across the right key trench and not 
across the left. However, as we have argued 
before, this is not by itself sufficient to 
explain the rapid demise of the dam because 
(1) time is required for seepage t~ transit the 
width of the key trench, and (2) due to the 
relatively modest initial exit gradient, soil 
would merely slough into an open joint on the 
downstream wall and piping would only work its 
way, slowly back to the upstream face. We 
concluded that the combination of these two 
effects would require much more time to fail 
the dam than the limited number of days 
(perhaps hours) in which the dam was breached. 
It seemed necessary for the flow rate into a 
downstream joint to be very high initially so 
that sloughed soil would immediately be washed 
out, thereby permitting a larger and larger 
channel to form rapidly. Only a preformed 
crack, or hydraulic fracturing, seemed to 
satisfy this requirement. The dilemma posed by 
this requirement remained unresolved for months 
until, one day, Leonards recalled earlier stu-
dies on the collapse of compacted clays 
(Leonards and Al tschaeffl, 1971). The brief 
treatment of "col]apse potential" in the IRG 
report (summarized in Fig. 4) came into focus, 
and the additional reduction in normal stress 
at the base of the key trench due to arching 
that would accompany the collapse was realized. 




Note:~ of key 
trench is not 
parallel to dam axis, 
All control 1 tests were tn 




3 7 / te ~ --.s--.6~.--ze ~ __ :L_ ___ .-..!~ _.!Q. 
\. / 
\. /POTENTIAL: 
20 o 20 40 \...... _ _/ COLLAPSE 
ZONE 
TEST DEV. OMC rd TEST DEV.OMC rd 
NO % pcf NO % pet 
1 0.9dry 95.4 6 2.0dry 98.6 
2 1.5dry 96.6 7 O.Sdry 189.8 
3 1.5dry 97.4 8 1.6dry 96.7 
4 "1 .OW&t 106..4 9 2.2dry 92.3 
5 2.2dry 100.!i 10 1.4weJ 103.3 
160 
FIG. 5 COMPACTION CONTROL TESTS RESULTS OI::TWEEN 
STA.13+90 AND STA.14+40, AND EL.5184 AND EL. 5118 
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Thus, 
SUBSIDENCE OR "COLLAPSE" OF A PERMEABLE 
DRY-SIDE COMPACTED LAYER SPANNING THE WIDTH 
OF THE KEY TRENCH ON T~E RIGHT ABUTMENT, 
PERMITTED HYDRAULIC FRACTURING (OR 
SEPARATION) TO OCCUR IN THE KEY TRENCH FILL 
THEREBY ALLOWING FLOW FROM OPEN JOINTS IN 
THE UPSTREAM WALL (WITH ACCESS TO THE 
RESERVOIR) TO OPEN JOINTS IN THE DOWNSTREAM 
WALL, 
is proposed as a failure mechanism that is 
fully supported by all the existing data. 
ONLY THE COMBINATION OF A PERMEABLE LAYER 
COLLAPSING ON SATURATION, AND OPEN JOINTS IN 
THE WALLS OF THE KEY TRENCH WITH ACCESS TO THE 
RESERVOIR, COULD PROVIDE THE NECESSARY DISCON-
TINUITY AND SUFFICIENT REDUCTION IN STRESS ON 
HORIZONTAL PLANES TO INDUCE HYDRAULIC FRAC-
TURING AND RESULT IN SO RAPID A FAILURE OF THE 
DAM. 
We immediately decided to test the validity of 
our proposal with large-scale model studies 
in the laboratory but, alas, the necessary 
resources were not available to us. However, 
the experiments described below were con-
ducted. 
As in previous collapse potential tests, 
samples were compacted dry of optimum into con-
solidation rings. Compression of the samples 
was measured, without wetting, up to a 
pressure of 80 lb/in2. The samples were then 
wetted; but, instead of allowing collapse to 
occur, the stress reduction necessary to main-
tain approximately constant volume was 
measured. Subsequently, collapse was allowed 
to occur. The results are shown in table 1. 
Thus, collapse of a dry-side compacted layer in 
the kev trench fill at the right abutment would 
reduce vertical stresses by soil arching and 
promote hydraulic fracturing at th~ interface 
with the stiff adjacent fill. We believe that 
the interface between two soil layers with dif-
ferent permeabilities is a discontinuity along 
which hydraulic fracturing can bccur, even if 
it is not initially a minor principal plane. 
This is-evidenced by the fact that hydraulic 
fracturing due to drilling at high air 
pressures caused onlt horizontal cracks to 
develop at least 25t - and possibly more than 
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50 feet - from the drill hole.* 
LESSONS LEARNED 
Following their retrospective review, Seed and 
Duncan (1982) listed 11 lessons to be learned 
from the Teton Dam failure. We basically agree 
with all of them, especially with the principle 
of "mUltiple 1 i nes of defense" advocated by 
Karl Terzaghi and Arthur Casagrande. Failure 
to adopt this approach, especially for the con-
ditions extant at Teton, was a serious design 
error. The principle also underscores the 
importance of understanding the actual mecha-
nisms of failure, which provide the only 
rational means of assessing benefit/cost ratios 
of different proposed "lines of defense." 
Moreover, they may avoid building in features 
that, for example, may be conducive to 
hydraulic fracturing, or to other undesirable 
conditions, even if measures to prevent seep-
age erosion are provided for. 
To the 11 lessons cited by Seed and Duncan, we 
add the following: 
I. Samples of Teton silt can be compacted 
to compaction ratios greater than 95 percent 
at water contents more than 8 percent dry of 
their Proctor optimum water contents; hence, 
it would be particularly difficult to judge 
the acceptability of field compaction. by 
visual inspection. Therefore, the frequency 
of compaction control tests should have been 
higher than usual. In the future, the 
"norms" for frequency of compaction control 
tests should not be applied indiscriminately 
to all soils. 
II. Considering the seriousness of the 
potential damage that could result, the dif-
ficulty of recognizing by visual inspection 
that something is amiss, and the inevitable 
occasional departures from the specifica-
tions associated with large construction 
operations, specifying dry side compaction 
(as low as 3.5 percent dry of OMC at Teton) 
should be viewed with great caution. 
* After our tests had been initiated, we became 
aware of a draft report (Johnson a~d Palmerton, 
1977) reviewing Appendix D of the Independent 
Panel's 1976 Report. Therein it was stated: 
"If an abnormally dry layer or layers of 
core material extended across the core 
trench, the material would consolidate, if 
saturated, much more than surrounding 
material. This may have resulted in arching 
at higher elevations and possibly in hori-
zontal channels. The most likely failure 
process would involve also hydraulic frac-
turing, since hydraulic fracturing and local 
volume decrease would each promote the 
other." 
Apart from the requirement that the collapsing 
layer initially must have a much higher per-
meability than the adjacent fill, to provide 
the necessary discontinuity for hydraulic frac-
turing to occur, these statements are similar 
to the conclusions we reached following more 
than 2 years of painstaking efforts. 
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Table 1. Results of "Collapse" tests 
Inherent Characteristics 





Max. dry density, lb/ft3 
Opt. water content, 
percent 
Compaction Conditions 
Dry density, lb/ft3 
Water content, percent 




0-80 lb/in2, percent 
Compression on wetting 
at 80 lb/2, percent 
Wetting to unwetted 
compression, percent 
"Restrained" Test 
Stress reduction on 
wetting, percent 
Axial strain during 
"restraint," percent** 
"Restraint" strain/ 




































*A more plastic sample from the wet seams was 
not available for testing. 
** Due to tolerances in assembly linkages. 
III. Variations in the properties of com-
pacted embankments are generally larger than 
those commonly anticipated. It is essential 
that steps be taken in design and construc-
tion practices not so much to reduce these 
variations greatly- which would be very 
expensive - but to identify potential 
problems and insure that layers with adverse 
properties do not have sufficient continuity 
to be troublesome. At Teton it was most 
likely a continuous layer of silt compacted 
in the key trench well dry of optimum; at 
Lake Shelbyvill~. it was established that a 
thin weak seam of more highly plastic clay 
was largely responsible for an upstream 
slope failure shortly after the dam was 
topped out (Humphrey and Leonards, 1984). 
IV. In spite of numerous past studies of 
the properties of compacted fine-grained 
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soils, there is still much to learn about 
(a) the mechanics of the field compaction 
process, including the manner in which 
sheepsfoot rollers compact silts and silty 
clays dry of optimum; (b) the differences in 
compacted properties -especially optimum 
moisture content, permeability, and 
compressibility- between field and labora-
tory compacted soils; and (c) the mechanics 
of hydraulic fracturing. Hydraulic frac-
turing is, potentially, so damaging a pro-
cess that it clearly merits further 
intensive study. 
V. A methodology for investigating failures 
(Leonards, 1979) was applied to Teton Dam. 
The search for a mechanism of failure con-
tinued until one was found compatible with 
all the known facts, which, in turn, 
suggested specific investigations that 
otherwise would not have been thought of. 
This resulted in: (a) the discovery that 
Teton silt had unusual compaction charac-
teristics dry of optimum (Fig. 2); (b) a 
directed search of compaction control 
records to identify the potential existence 
of continuous layers in the key trenches 
compacted dry of optimum (Fig 5); and (c) 
special tests to measure the relief in 
stress associated with collapse on wetting 
(table 1). 
VI. Each successive study of the Teton Dam 
failure contributed to our understanding of 
earth dam behavior. This demonstrates that 
there is much to be gained from continued_ 
retrospective analyses of past failures, 1n 
the light of current knowledge. It has been 
shown that there is no reason to be compla-
cent about the lessons learned from past 
investigations of failures (Leonards, 1982). 
A National Agency possessing (among other 
attributes) the expertise and resources for 
such continued studies would be of great 
benefit to the civil engineering profession 
and to the public at large. 
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